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Chapter 7* 
Democratic ownership and deliberative participation 
Cillian McBride  
 
What is ‘democratic ownership’ and how is it related to political participation? I will 
argue that democratic ownership requires us to think of ourselves as participating in a form of 
collective agency and that a proceduralist account of political legitimacy is better suited to 
explaining this collective political agency than an instrumental, purely outcome-oriented, 
account of legitimacy. While direct participation has traditionally been viewed as essential to 
the exercise of collective agency, I will offer reasons to think that it is the specifically 
deliberative quality of democratic procedures that does the real work of producing collective 
agency out of individual engagement, and not the directness of the participation involved. To 
stand in a relationship of ownership to democratic outcomes it is not enough that we benefit 
from these outcomes, or find them desirable: we must also have had a share in producing 
them through an appropriate political procedure. 
Democratic ownership can be directly contrasted with political alienation, and 
another way to express my argument would be to say that we have reason to think that 
inclusive deliberative democratic procedures will less alienating than more minimalist 
accounts of democracy. Instrumental accounts of political legitimacy offer relatively weak 
defences against alienation precisely because they are not centrally concerned with the 
question of collective agency in the way proceduralist accounts are. Political alienation is  
*Published in Martyn Barrett and Bruna Zani (Eds), Political and Civic Engagement: multidisciplinary perspectives. 
(London: Routledge, 2015), pp.109-123. 
  
 
 
 clearly a direct threat to political freedom. When citizens are politically alienated they regard 
the political process and the decisions that are produced by it as ‘alien’, i.e. as disconnected  
from their own lives and goals. Political decisions appear to them as alien impositions 
interfering with their lives. In a well-ordered democracy citizens should be able to view 
political decisions as, in some way, the product of their collective will and the institutions and 
procedures which produced those decisions as their own and not as alien forces in their lives. 
We should hope, then, that citizens of democratic states should be in a position to recognise 
themselves in their political institutions and to regard collective decisions as consistent with 
their freedom, rather than as potential threats to it. 
Citizens who regard themselves as standing in a relationship of ownership to political 
decisions have reasons to respect and uphold these decisions, independently of any 
consideration of possible sanctions for not doing so. Citizens who enjoy democratic 
ownership will regard themselves as responsible for political decisions, in contrast to 
alienated citizens, who are motivated primarily by the prospect of sanctions for non-
compliance, and who will not regard themselves as bound to, or responsible for, decisions 
made in their name. 
To the extent that democratic government purports to be an exercise of freedom, and 
claims authority over us on this basis, democrats should be worried about the prospect of 
political alienation. This is different, however, from the worry that contemporary citizens are 
apathetic, and unwilling to participate in politics (Sandel 1996: 6; Putnam 2001: 349). This 
moralising complaint focuses on the alleged lack of civic virtue exhibited by insufficiently 
altruistic modern individuals (Cohen 1999; McBride 2012). The threat of political alienation 
as presented here, however, is a worry about our institutions, rather than about the virtues of 
our citizens. Specifically, it prompts us to consider whether or not the current configuration 
  
 
 
of our democratic institutions gives citizens reasons to view them as consistent with 
democratic ownership. 
Citizens may, however, regard themselves as standing in a relationship of ownership 
to their political institutions without good reason. This may be adequate for producing a 
measure of political stability, but these cases should be just as worrying to the democrat as 
cases of political alienation. In each case, democratic institutions may be, in reality, alien 
impositions upon their citizens. Deliberative democratic procedures, however, make possible 
a form of collective agency which allows citizens to reasonably see themselves as sharing in 
ownership of the political institutions which shape the context of their lives.  
 
The Minimalist Challenge 
Even today, talk of democratic participation conjures up images of ancient Athenian direct 
democracy, and discussions of contemporary democratic politics are dogged by the nagging 
suspicion that large-scale representative democracy is, somehow, just a pale shadow of 
authentic, direct, democracy (Barber 1984: 145). There is, however, a tradition of sceptical 
thought about democratic politics which contests the primacy of this model. Schumpeter 
provides a classic statement of this ‘minimalist’ view, arguing that the key virtue of 
democratic rule is that it simply provides a peaceful means to exchange one political elite for 
another through periodic elections (Schumpeter 1965: 273). Schumpeter regards popular 
participation as, at best, unnecessary and, at worst, a recipe for ill-informed and irresponsible 
government, as the ordinary citizen knows little and cares less about affairs beyond their 
immediate experience (1965: 258-9). Given general ignorance and civic irresponsibility, the 
‘minimalist’ democrat may conclude that we have good reason to limit popular participation 
and that consequently, we should view evidence of falling electoral turnouts with equanimity. 
  
 
 
If democratic politics is a marketplace, and the voter simply a consumer (Christiano 1996: 
133), shopping around for the best deal, then perhaps low turnout simply reflects broad civic 
satisfaction with governments that do not sharply differ in terms of the deals that they are 
offering their customers.   
 Even if one is not swayed by these arguments, there are, in addition, significant moral 
reasons to question the classical model (Cohen 1997: 80). The Athenian model is not simply 
a blueprint for direct democratic institutions, but an ethical vision of the best way for human 
beings to live. Man being a political animal, according to Aristotle, the good life is that of the 
active citizen, for only this sort of life will engage and perfect man’s true nature (Aristotle, 
1946: 5-7). Liberals tend to be sceptical about this line of argument: this way of thinking 
about citizenship and democracy focuses on the ‘sectarian’ assumption that the life of the 
active citizen is of preeminent value, a view which is incompatible with ethical pluralism, i.e. 
the view that there are many good ways to live (Cohen 1997). For liberals there is something 
disturbingly authoritarian about the Aristotelian commitment to active citizenship. Instead of 
lamenting a lost world of tight-knit, active community, we should instead embrace the ethical 
possibilities which modern society affords its members, who may wish to be free from 
politics as much as free to engage in it when they choose. Liberals, however, need not regard 
the commitments of citizenship as on a par with lifestyle choice, but may argue that everyone 
has a basic interest in political autonomy, even if we have reason not to choose to devote our 
entire lives to active political participation. The argument from value pluralism, then, 
suggests that there are reasons to reject aspects of the classical model, even if technology now 
holds out the prospect of making direct democracy feasible for modern states through 
electronic voting and web-based virtual publics etc. (Fishkin 1991: 21; Sunstein 2007: 34). 
 
  
 
 
Instrumentalism and legitimacy 
In the Aristotelian account, the reason why we should favour direct political participation is 
that any other form of political organisation is simply unnatural. This view was challenged 
first in the seventeenth century by Hobbes’ (1996) contractarian account of political 
legitimacy. Hobbes makes two important moves: firstly, in presenting political society as a 
product of human will, he focuses our attention squarely on the problem of political 
legitimacy: the reasons we have for obeying the law. Secondly, he offers an essentially 
instrumental account of legitimacy of the sort relied on by minimalist democrats today. 
Hobbes’ instrumental account of legitimacy assumes that liberty is essentially individual, and 
negative. I am free, on this view, only to the extent that I am not subject to deliberate external 
interference with my wishes (Hobbes 1996: 152; Berlin 1969: 122). The law of the land is 
clearly a threat to my liberty, as more law means less freedom. However, Hobbes argues that 
the absence of political rule poses an even greater threat to my welfare and ultimately, to my 
life itself. Consequently, contracting into political society is a good deal. The cost to my 
liberty is more than made up for by the gain in security.  
We see this line of argument developed further by Hume, who suggests that we can 
drop all this talk about social contracts and focus directly on the benefits which government 
produces for us, chiefly, the protection of private property (Hume, 1963:463). The precise 
configuration of political institutions is of little consequence on this view, provided 
government delivers the desired outcomes. Defences of technocratic government today 
follow this pattern: it is rational to downplay the significance of political participation in 
favour of governments which possess technical expertise and a measure of independence 
from the grubby world of politics, provided these governments can deliver the sort of 
outcomes which the voters favour: stability and prosperity. 
  
 
 
Richard Arneson’s defence of an instrumental account of political legitimacy hinges 
on a similar trade-off, although his preferred outcome is characterised in terms of the defence 
of fundamental rights, rather than in terms of peace or the protection of property (2003: 129). 
He argues that the legitimacy of a set of political institutions has nothing to do with the 
fairness of its procedures, of the opportunities for popular participation, but everything to do 
with the sort of consequences the system delivers for citizens (Arneson 2003: 122). Arneson 
acknowledges that his ‘purely instrumental’ view is controversial in view of the widely held 
assumption that democratic legitimacy is a product both of the fairness of the procedures for 
making collective decisions, and of the beneficial consequences of the decisions taken. He 
insists, however, that it is this latter feature of democratic institutions that is fundamental 
(Arneson 2003: 136). 
This poses a significant challenge to the claim that political participation has intrinsic 
value. There is nothing special about political participation as a method for producing 
political decisions and effective public policy. Romantic, ‘agonist’, (Arendt 1958; Mouffe 
2000) ideas about democratic participation which tend to focus on their value for participants 
can reasonably be said to have mistaken the point of democratic politics (Elster 1997: 25). 
Even if direct participation might make us better people it needs more argument to show that 
it deliver better public healthcare provision or the effective conduct of foreign affairs. 
Arneson suggests that the view that democratic procedures are distinguished by the way that 
they ‘express’ a public commitment to equality is misconceived (2003: 131). Democratic 
institutions themselves need not be especially participatory, particularly if a case can be made 
that less participatory institutional forms, such as judicial review, are more efficient at 
delivering the protection of fundamental rights. 
 
  
 
 
Proceduralism and legitimacy 
The instrumental argument suggests that we should be relatively unconcerned by hierarchical, 
exclusive, political institutions provided they work together to produce the appropriate 
outcomes. This is a theory of legitimacy which essentially dispenses with the idea of 
democratic ownership and its requirement that citizens can recognise themselves as agents 
producing political outcomes. While they may endorse the outcomes, and judge that these are 
worth paying for in terms of the necessary reduction of personal liberty which government 
entails, they are not required to play a significant role in producing these outcomes. Citizens 
in this sort of minimalist democracy may enjoy a measure of individual freedom, some of 
which they have traded for a system which provides other benefits, but they cannot be said to 
be participating in the exercise of collective, political, autonomy. Arguably, even their 
individual freedom may not be secure under such arrangements (Pettit 1996). 
Our long-standing and deeply rooted understanding of democracy, however, is that it is 
the institution that makes a form of collective agency possible. Democracy does not simply 
protect individual freedom, it also makes possible a form of collective agency in which 
citizens share as participants in democratic co-authorship. In the Social Contract Rousseau 
(1997b) outlines a form of government which, if it cannot permit us total independence of 
one another, can perhaps ensure our equal freedom. The central feature of this form of rule is 
direct democracy which, Rousseau suggests, will enable the citizen to obey the law, while 
‘each, uniting with all, [will] nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before’ 
(1997b: 49-50). Through sharing in the General Will, the Rousseauan citizen can recognise 
himself in the laws of the land as they are the product of his agency (Rousseau, 1997b:49). 
Where Aristotelian accounts are focused more generally on the relationship between 
participation in a political community and human flourishing (eudaimonia), Rousseau’s 
  
 
 
argument is specifically concerned with the relationship between individual and collective 
freedom. 
Rousseau goes on, unfortunately, to suggest that individuals can be ‘forced to be free’ 
(1997b: 53) in obeying this General Will, giving rise to the suspicion that talk of collective 
agency must lead directly to totalitarianism (Berlin 1969). It is worth noting that while 
notions of collective freedom will make little sense to those who understand freedom to be 
essentially negative, Rousseau’s account of political legitimacy is an important milestone in 
the development of the contemporary liberal theories of deliberative democracy on account of 
the way that the notion of the general will functions as an early version of the ideal of public 
reason (Cohen 2010). The task, for contemporary democrats is to envision a model of 
collective agency that can generate the appropriate level of collective agency in citizens to 
allow them to stand in a relationship of democratic ownership to political outcomes without 
adopting the overly unified understanding of collective agency embodied in Rousseau’s 
model (Pettit 2013: 15). We will need a model of collective agency that is consistent with 
respecting reasonable pluralism and political dissent, without surrendering the ideal of 
collective self-determination through democratic institutions. 
The reason we should aim for an agency-centred account of political legitimacy is that it 
is more sensitive to the problem of political alienation than any instrumental account and it 
can, consequently, provide us with a more robust account of political legitimacy. Far from 
threatening to dismiss the problem of pluralism, the particular sort of procedural account of 
collective agency developed here is better suited to accommodating dissent than rival 
accounts of political legitimacy, thereby minimising the dangers of political alienation. It has 
greater potential to generate reasons to comply with political decisions, in particular, than the 
outcome-focused, instrumental view. 
  
 
 
Collective decisions must be taken in the face of significant disagreement (Gutmann and 
Thompson 1995, 1996; Waldron 1999). But this in turn gives rise to the problem that while 
those on the winning side of a vote have a clear reason to uphold the outcome, i.e. their 
substantive agreement with the decision, it is less clear what reason those on the losing side 
must have, at least on a narrowly instrumental account of legitimacy. Citizens on the losing 
side have, on the contrary, a substantive reason to resist this outcome: their belief that this is 
simply the wrong outcome. The appeal to generalised outcomes such as ‘peace’ ‘stability’ 
‘overall welfare’ or, as in Arneson’s case, the protection of ‘fundamental rights’ is supposed 
to supply the missing reason for compliance, but it is not hard to see why this strategy is 
unsatisfactory.  
Firstly, this relies on characterising outcomes with a high degree of generality in order to 
bolster the sense that they can supply reasons to all citizens. However, generalisation does not 
eliminate disagreement about what counts as a desirable outcome. It is clear that there is 
significant moral disagreement even about the content of basic rights, as disputes about the 
permissibility of abortion, or gay marriage indicate. If what counts as an appropriate outcome 
can become the subject of significant dispute, (and any significant account of basic resources, 
capabilities, or welfare will typically be controversial), then the appeal to outcomes may not 
supply the legitimising reasons necessary to produce compliance. Secondly, we might also be 
concerned that outcome-oriented legitimacy might in effect be relying heavily on the wrong 
sorts of reasons to compliance. That is to say, that faced with bad decisions, producing the 
wrong sorts of outcomes, citizens may nonetheless comply simply because the costs of 
resisting are simply too high to risk dissent. This is unsatisfactory even where a regime can 
exert enough control to tip the costs in its favour, for citizens can only regard political 
decisions as alien impositions under such conditions. 
  
 
 
Democratic states aspire to a higher standard of legitimacy than this: they aspire to 
recognition of their authority and not merely weary, conditional, compliance. But how can 
we understand compliance with laws one disagrees with as consistent with one’s freedom 
rather simply a majoritarian imposition? The answer must lie in a proceduralist model of 
legitimacy. This model directs attention away from substantive judgements about particular 
courses of action and onto the reason-generating power of the procedures by which the 
decisions were made.  
Richard Wollheim (1962) argued that the apparently paradoxical nature of democratic 
citizenship could be resolved in this way. When I vote for option A but am outvoted, I find 
myself in the apparently paradoxical position that I must now believe that both A, and B - the 
option preferred by the majority – ought to be done (Wollheim 1962: 78-9).  Given the fact of 
political disagreement this is not an uncommon situation. The solution, Wollheim argued, lies 
in stratifying the reasons for action involved here, i.e. distinguishing between the substantive 
reasons for preferring option A over option B, and the procedural reasons for acting on B 
rather than A (Wollheim 1962: 85). By assigning them to different levels, such that 
procedural reasons can, at least in the right conditions, override substantive reasons, we can 
see how one might have reasons for compliance despite substantive disagreement. 
One of the most problematic features of Rousseau’s particular account is that he has a 
strongly epistemic account of democratic procedures, i.e. he regards them as an extremely 
reliable way to track truth. The general will, he assures us, can never be wrong, with the 
alarming result that anyone on the wrong side of a vote must regard themselves as having 
made a mistake of some sort. In Rousseau’s account, the procedural reason defeats the 
citizen’s substantive judgement and replaces it with the collective judgement. While there 
are, contra Schumpeter, often good epistemic reasons to favour collective decision-making 
over elite decision-making, no one would want to go as far as Rousseau who effectively 
  
 
 
claims that dissent from the general will is always mistaken (Goodin 2003: 145). Recognising 
democratic authority is not a matter of replacing one’s own judgement with that of the 
majority, but of accepting that one has reasons to comply in the face of one’s dissent 
(Friedman 1990). On Wollheim’s account, the right sort of procedure can offer reasons which 
override the citizen’s substantive reasons without defeating them. That is to say, that one can 
consistently, on this view, believe that one has a reason to accept a vote as authoritative, 
while at the same time viewing it as mistaken and working to reverse this decision (as 
opposed to merely resisting it as an individual). This sort of procedural account, unlike 
Rousseau’s, does not simply dissolve the individual into the collective, respecting them as 
autonomous agents in their own right, who may have reasons to participate in the exercise of 
collective agency notwithstanding their dissent from some of the decisions taken as a result. 
The idea that is doing the work here is that of a fair procedure: an unfair procedure will 
obviously fail to generate the right sorts of reasons for action. A fair procedure will generate 
reasons for me to accept an outcome even where I disagree with it. These reasons allow me to 
identify with the outcome, even if this identification is limited by my substantive dissent, and 
where such identification is possible I can regard that decision as one I have a share in, i.e. 
one that I own. As such, even where I have reason to seek to have this decision overturned, 
this collective decision ought not to be automatically viewed as an obstacle to my self-
determination. Without this sort of procedural account, only majorities on a given issue 
would be genuinely obliged to uphold that decision while minorities are merely corralled by 
the threat of sanctions. To avoid the charge of majority tyranny, democratic authority must be 
produced by procedures through which citizens can recognise themselves as the authors of 
collective actions, not merely enjoying the benefits of government, but contributing to the 
production of these benefits themselves. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
What counts as a fair procedure? 
In this account, one’s reasons to comply are generated by one’s underlying commitment to 
the particular procedure for arriving at collective decisions. Fair procedures may take a wide 
variety of forms, however, all the way from the simple coin toss, or ‘king for a day’ (Estlund 
1997) to complex democratic procedures, involving majority and qualified majority decision 
rules of various sorts, as well as elections and, occasionally, referendums. What sorts of 
procedure are best suited to generating these sorts of reasons? Representative democracy 
relies, centrally, on participation of elections, the outcomes of which are determined by 
aggregating votes in various ways. This relatively ‘thin’ procedure relies on the idea that 
every citizen has a formally equal opportunity to influence the outcome of collective 
decision-making through the exercise of their vote. 
One obvious problem with this account is that of the mismatch between formally equal 
opportunities provided by the distribution of votes, and the unequal distribution of political 
influence within societies, which can be traced back to underlying inequalities in the 
distribution of economic, social, and cultural capital  in those societies. Against the backdrop 
of these inequalities, the claim of a simple vote aggregating procedure to be sufficiently fair 
as to permit citizens to reasonably identify with political decisions may seem rather weak. 
While everyone may enjoy one vote, voting is only one of the ways in which the political 
agenda is shaped and substantive opportunities to shape that agenda are not distributed 
equally. The problem of the relationship between political equality and wider social equality, 
and the ways in which the latter diminishes the worth of the former, is a complex one which 
cannot be solved by attention to political procedures alone (Phillips 1999). We can say, 
  
 
 
however, that some political procedures offer stronger reasons to regard them as fair, than 
others. 
Is direct participation uniquely important in this respect? One might suppose that direct 
participation might go some way to evening out political influence by doing away with the 
distinction between representatives and ordinary voters. If nothing else, it would impose 
higher costs on social elites seeking to exert influence on decision-makers simply by 
increasing the numbers of decision-makers, and, on the assumption of universal suffrage, 
increasing the social diversity of those decision-makers. In the ancient Greek version of direct 
democracy, democracy was not confined to direct participation through voting, but also 
included the distribution of political office by lottery and rotation, such that each citizen 
would have an equal opportunity of being selected to occupy public office (Manin 1997: 28).  
When Aristotle characterised democracy in terms of each citizen having an equal share in 
self-government, he meant this quite literally: citizens would take turns in ruling, as well as 
having the opportunity to participate directly in decision making (Aristotle 1946: 112). 
This model, despite its iconic significance, fails to connect participation to political 
outcomes in a sufficiently robust way. Firstly, it is difficult to see taking turns in public office 
as sufficient to permit citizens to recognise collective decisions as their own. In effect, I am 
simply obeying others while I am waiting for my turn to rule. In practice the ratio of citizens 
to offices is likely to mean that even in very small political communities my number is 
unlikely ever to come up (Manin 1997: 29). On its own, taking turns in ruling is not, in any 
event, really a mechanism for producing collective agency, it only purports to make rule by 
others more palatable by holding out the prospect that, someday, each will get to exercise 
individual agency over others for a limited time.  
  
 
 
Much more important than occupying executive positions is the way in which collective 
decisions are made, and here, deliberative democrats have argued, there is little virtue to 
direct forms of participation over indirect. I may be consistently outvoted by self-interested 
majorities advancing their own interests at my expense in both direct and indirect, 
representative, forms of democracy. In each case, the claim to legitimacy relies on the formal 
equality offered by the equal distribution of votes, and in each case, I may have good reason 
to regard the resulting decisions as alien impositions visited upon me by majorities to whom I 
am, at best, no more than a minor impediment to their projects. Indeed, as Fishkin notes, this 
problem may be accentuated in direct democratic polities where the small numbers may make 
democratic decision-making more vulnerable to populism (Fishkin 1991). 
Deliberative democrats argue that the contrast between direct and indirect participation is 
less significant than that between purely aggregative procedures and those which include both 
deliberative and aggregative elements. As we noted above, the minimalist account of 
democracy as a procedure for exchanging political elites by means of popular elections relies 
on the assumption that voters are essentially consumers, whose only concern is to make a 
rational choice between the benefits attached offered by different candidates. A purely 
aggregative procedure places no restriction on the reasoning involved in political choice or on 
the formation of majorities whose only concern may be to advance their own interests at the 
expense of others. In this respect there is no difference between direct and indirect political 
participation. Citizens in the minorities under both direct and indirect participatory systems 
may reasonably judge that political decisions are not binding upon them.  
Against this, deliberative democrats argue that including a deliberative component in 
democratic procedures can constrain majorities and thereby strengthen the reasons of 
minorities to accept the resulting decisions (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). There are other 
advantages to replacing the aggregation of ‘raw preferences’ with considered judgements. By 
  
 
 
offering citizens opportunities to discuss their political preferences with others they may 
correct false assumptions and thereby contribute to the making of better informed political 
decisions. They may discover that some of their preferences are the product of processes of 
adaptation to inequality, which have lowered their ambitions and distorted their 
understandings of their own interests (Cohen 1997: 78) and in this way public deliberation 
may enhance their autonomy to the extent that their actions are more likely to reflect their 
considered interests. 
Perhaps the most pertinent feature of deliberative democracy, however, relates to the link 
between public justification and equal respect. Any decision we make raises questions about 
the impacts of our actions upon others. These impacts may be positive or negative, and many 
political disputes centre on the problem of determining where to draw the line between which 
negative effects are permissible and which call for state-interventions of various sorts. There 
is no clear-cut distinction between public and private, and even simple consumer decisions 
about what food to buy or what mode of transport to adopt may turn out to have significant 
impacts on the lives of others, posing pressing questions of distributive justice. Whatever the 
status of the choices we make as private citizens it is clear that the choices we make 
regarding collective decisions will not only have an impact on the lives of others, but also 
involve a further claim to authority over these lives. If I vote for a party promising me tax 
cuts in return for more limited public services, my choice will not only have an effect on my 
fellow citizens, I am committed to requiring them to uphold this decision should it win the 
vote. A purely aggregative model wrongly assumes that such choices are essentially private, 
despite the way that my choices not only affect others but also claim authority over them. 
Deliberative democrats argue that these sorts of choices and claims impose upon citizens 
a duty of justification (Rawls 1996) and argue that to fail to offer appropriate justifications 
for one’s attempts to direct our common coercive force essentially violates the basic moral 
  
 
 
requirement to respect our fellow citizens as equals. To respect others as equals is not to 
necessarily refrain from imposing costs upon them (we may punish others consistent with 
respecting them as persons) but it is to regard them as distinct persons with their own 
interests and projects which must be taken into consideration when we formulate our own 
political projects. The duty of justification also entails that we respect them as persons 
capable of responding to reasons, thereby ruling out the paternalist view that we may 
deliberate about the interests of others without deliberating with them. Finally, it recognises 
that others have the power to call us to account for our choices, i.e. to place us under this duty 
of justification. This broadly Kantian account of equal respect between democratic citizens 
presents us with an account of democratic procedures as embodying a key form of social 
recognition: that of our equal moral standing as citizens, and it assumes that recognition of 
our equal status imposes constraints on how decisions may legitimately be made the sorts of 
reasons which may count as appropriate public justifications (Rawls 1993: 217). 
This ‘expressive’ dimension is not incidental to democratic institutions as Arneson 
suggests. Given the ‘burdens of judgement’ (Rawls 1993: 56-7) it should be clear that public 
deliberation is not a device for producing deep consensus on political questions and it will not 
eliminate the need for voting once deliberation has taken place. Even if we recognise our duty 
as citizens to consider the interests of our fellow citizens and to offer public justifications for 
our political preferences which we judge they could not reasonably reject, we are still likely 
to disagree in our political judgements. Consequently, majority voting will still be necessary 
to move from deliberation to decision and action. However, while I may have little reason to 
regard myself as bound to uphold decisions produced by a purely aggregative procedure my 
reasons to accept decisions taken through aggregation which has been preceded by 
deliberation are considerably stronger. This is because public deliberation itself manifests 
recognition of my equal status in a more demanding fashion than the distribution of equal 
  
 
 
votes and furthermore it gives me reasons to suppose that my interests have received some 
consideration by others, which may be entirely absent on purely aggregative procedures 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 72). As such I can reasonably regard myself as having shared 
in producing this decision, even where I reject the substance of that decision. In this way, a 
deliberative procedure can strengthen my reasons for judging that democratic outcomes are 
the product of collective agency in which I have participated and to which I stand in a 
relationship of democratic ownership.  
 
The importance of political agency 
The virtue of the proceduralist account of democratic authority is that it provides an account 
of the centrality of the idea of freedom, i.e. of self-determination, to democratic citizenship. It 
would be a mistake to view the normative claims of proceduralism as merely expressive, as 
Arneson does, for they are concerned rather with setting out the conditions whereby an 
individual agent can come to identify themselves as the co-author of collective actions, i.e. 
through participation in the right sort of procedure for taking collective decisions about how 
to use collective coercive power. The consequentialist is right to point to the fact that 
democratic politics is about successfully intervening in the world, but a pure 
consequentialism does not account for the difference between desirable outcomes and 
outcomes that are brought about through the exercise of collective agency. While the former, 
in its pure form, risks treating beneficial outcomes like good weather – a welcome occurrence 
over which we have no control - the latter aims at deliberate intervention in the world, which 
depends on the appropriate connection between deliberative inputs and real world outcomes 
(Pettit and List 2011).  
  
 
 
To be concerned with consequences without caring how these are to be produced is to 
take a curiously disconnected view of collective action, such that we should welcome 
desirable outcomes of such action without being concerned to take steps to ensure that we 
secure such outcomes and that we can, in consequence, have some confidence in our ability 
to intervene in the world over time. While a legitimate government must be one that delivers 
desirable outcomes with some measure of regularity, the degree to which we can reliably 
count on producing such outcomes must be closely related to the sorts of procedures in place 
for taking collective decisions and translating them into action. Otherwise, beneficial 
consequences would appear to fall like manna from heaven in an arbitrary fashion unrelated 
to the actions of citizens. It is plausible to suppose that we have an interest not only in 
receiving benefits from the actions of the state, as the instrumental account would have it, but 
also that we have an interest in participating in producing those benefits, i.e. an interest in 
self-determination, that explains our concern with the problems of political alienation and 
democratic ownership. 
I have concentrated here on the problem of outlining the conditions under which 
individual citizens can reasonably regard themselves as participating in an exercise of 
collective agency through democratic participation. It is worth noting, however, that 
collective agency and democratic ownership are not exclusively concerned with the ways in 
which beneficial consequences can be produced through collective action. Focusing on the 
reason-generating powers of desirable outcomes in the way that instrumental accounts of 
legitimacy do, has another important defect: it diverts us from the problem of collective 
responsibility for our collective actions, problems which must loom large if our shared 
institutions serve to produce bad consequences, whether for ourselves or for others. To the 
extent that we participate, individually, in institutional arrangements that threaten to unjustly 
distribute burdens to others, we appear to share in responsibility for these injustices (Pogge 
  
 
 
2007: 30). We should, accordingly, be concerned, not only with our freedom to act together 
to intervene in the world, but also our responsibility for the actions thereby produced. It is, 
then, a strength of the agency-centred account of political legitimacy that it focuses our 
attention on the connection between our actions and their outcomes, reminding us that 
democratic ownership is not simply a matter of enjoying the benefits of collective action, but 
also, of taking responsibility for them. 
This proceduralist account of collective agency focuses on our reasons for endorsing or 
identifying with political decisions. I have argued that public deliberation offers us reasons to 
identify ourselves as owners of political decisions, even when we would prefer that some 
other decision had been taken. I have stressed the question of whether or not we have reason 
to identify in this way with political outcomes in order to distinguish my procedural account 
from other ways in which people may come to identify with political outcomes. Instrumental 
democracy offers one very limited set of reasons to identify with outcomes: they benefit us in 
some way. Identity-based accounts, offer different reasons, which rely on some alleged 
identity between citizens and decision-makers. What I have in mind here are nationalist or 
populist accounts of democracy, on which we share in self-government provided we are ruled 
by people with whom we share an identity (Habermas 1998). As long as the political elite is 
drawn from the relevant nation, then fellow nationals may come to identify with their 
decisions as ‘ours’. While shared identity may provide reasons to suppose that one’s 
representatives may share our interests and incentivise them to act as ‘fiery advocates’ for 
these interests (Phillips 1995), there is also a risk that shared social identities may produce 
unreasoned identification, i.e. that we will identify with political outcomes even though our 
institutions offer us little reason to suppose that decision-making is really affording us the 
sorts of opportunities for participation which sustain genuine political agency.   
  
 
 
A second problem relating to the idea of reasons to identify with/endorse political 
decisions is that it is possible that identification/endorsement may come apart from any 
causal role in the production of these outcomes. One might say that arguments for direct 
participation focus almost exclusively on the causal inputs provided by individual 
preferences, but fail to explain how these are transformed into genuinely collective decisions 
which offer all citizens reasons to regard themselves as bound to those decisions. There is 
also a risk that we might have good reasons to endorse decisions which we have not had any 
role in producing. We might capture this contrast in the following ways. Firstly, as a direct 
democrat I may be personally present at a meeting in which the ‘public deliberation’ involves 
little more than grandstanding and barracking followed by a vote  - a process that offers at 
best, very limited reasons for compliance. Secondly, I may follow the progress of healthcare 
reform proposals through the legislature from the comfort of my armchair in which I browse 
the relevant websites and read the relevant newspaper reports, forming an informed view of 
the options and ultimately judging that I have reason to endorse the outcome, whether 
substantively or procedurally, but without my contributing to this outcome in any way. 
If our current institutions offer limited opportunities for direct participation, we may be 
content with the idea that modern media make the decision-making process sufficiently 
transparent to make it possible that we could reasonably endorse decisions and processes 
without any involvement in their production. This is problematic, however, from the point of 
view of political agency: there must at the very least be genuine opportunities for citizens to 
actively shape public opinion and thereby to have some causal influence on the production of 
political decisions. Even if citizens do not often take up these opportunities, their existence 
would provide them with some reason to suppose that the relevant perspectives were being 
included and considered in the streams of public deliberation from which decisions flow. In 
the absence of such opportunities, however, we should have little reason to suppose that our 
  
 
 
deliberative procedures were working well and operating fairly. The existence of such 
concrete opportunities and their equal distribution might be thought of as providing the 
minimal conditions for judging that our political institutions genuinely afford us the 
possibility of democratic ownership. It is not clear that, in practice, we should be especially 
confident that our actually existing democracies meet these conditions. 
 
Conclusion 
The consequentialist account focuses on the consequences of what is done, without attending 
to how we might go about producing the desired consequences, while a purely proceduralist 
account might aim to take decisions fairly, regardless of the quality of those decisions. 
However, it is evident that as agents, we care about making the right decisions in order to 
intervene in the world in the right ways, and in order to do so, we must care about how we go 
about making such decisions – both inputs and outputs matter to the business of acting 
successfully. So too, in the case of collective action, we must care about the processes by 
which decisions are taken if we want to get the answers right more often than not. 
Deliberative proceduralism has the resources to close the gap between what a citizen thinks 
ought to be done and what the demos has decided to do, whenever these come apart, as they 
must from time to time.  In so doing, deliberative political procedures allow citizens to view 
themselves as sharing in collective political agency and as enjoying democratic ownership 
over the decisions which shape their lives. 
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